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RULE 23 AND THE TRIUMPH OF
EXPERIENCE
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF*
I
INTRODUCTION
Four years ago, on the fiftieth anniversary of the watershed 1966 reforms of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I had the opportunity to interview my
colleague and friend Arthur Miller on the transformation of Rule 23.1 Beginning
in the early 1960s when the Rules Committee commenced its work on
overhauling the joinder rules, Miller was much the junior participant in that
process, leaving him now the only living memory of the discussions and debates
that launched modern class action process. As an assistant to Benjamin Kaplan,
the Reporter on the amendments, Miller served as scribe, draftsman, confidante,
and shrewd observer to the lions of the legal world giving birth to a powerful new
litigation tool. The theme of an old guard confronting and trying to contain a new
world is a constant in literature, from Shakespeare to Chekhov, and is always
filled with drama, misperception, and yet the potential for great insight. Though
perhaps not quite imparting those epic themes, in its own way our little
procedural innovation was a great story of the past giving birth to the future. And
Miller is always a great storyteller.
At the end of the interview, I asked Miller what he thought the reaction of
those gathered a half-century earlier would have been to some of the further
reaches of class action law today.2 Such cross-temporal questions are always hard
as it requires projecting forward from a world in which jet planes had only
recently come on line for commercial travel, the fax machine was a decade away,
legal pleadings were still typed by hand, and the first photocopier had only
recently come to market. But the seeds of the present can always be found in the
past, and the question was what elements would have been recognizable even
across technological frontiers.
To ground the discussion, I inquired about what reactions might have been to
three of the largest class action cases of recent times: the Deepwater Horizon
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1. Samuel Issacharoff & Peter Zimroth, An Oral History of Rule 23: An Interview with Professor
Arthur Miller, 74 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 105 (2018) [hereinafter Miller].
2. Id. at 124–27.
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litigation in the Fifth Circuit,3 the Volkswagen emissions case in the Ninth
Circuit,4 and the NFL Concussion litigation in the Third Circuit.5 Like so many
cases, large and small, each had yielded a settlement that was in turn subject to
challenge by objectors of various kinds, including a settling party itself—British
Petroleum—in the Fifth Circuit.6
The pervasive fact of settlement by itself marked an evolution in class action
practice, and the term “settlement” did not appear in the 1966 version of the
Rules. As Miller captured the ethos of the time, a class action was conceived of
as “trial-ready.”7 The word “settlement” did not appear in the Rules at all until
1983 when Miller, serving as the Reporter to the Advisory Committee,
introduced it into the new found managerial powers of the courts under Rule 16.8
The term did not appear in Rule 23 until 2003 when Rule 23(e) was changed from
“Dismissal or Compromise” to “Settlement, Voluntary Dismissal, or
Compromise.” And only in 2018 was Rule 23 amended to reach “a class proposed
to be certified for purposes of settlement[.]”9 Even so, as the Supreme Court
noted in 1997, and even without formal amendment, “[a]mong current
applications of Rule 23(b)(3), the ‘settlement only’ class ha[d] become a stock
device.”10 On this view, the Rules provide guidance, “[b]ut they are not all
encompassing.”11
In teaching complex litigation together, Miller and I had remarked that when
he served as Reporter for the Complex Litigation Project of the American Law
Institute12 in the 1980s, the main focus had been trying to harmonize state and
federal cases for common trial; there had been no discussion of judicial oversight
of settlement. By the time I served as Reporter for the Aggregate Litigation
Project twenty years later, one of the main themes became the role and proper
regulation of settlement.13 Aggregate litigation had been reorganized on the
ground, with the organizing principle being settlement rather than trial. But that

3. In re Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon II), 744 F.3d 370 (5th Cir. 2014).
4. In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg. Litig., 895 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2018).
5. In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Inj. Litig., 821 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2016).
6. I must disclose having participated in these cases, including as counsel on appeal. Nothing
presented here goes beyond the public record in decisions in the cases.
7. Miller, supra note 1, at 126.
8. Id.
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (introductory paragraph); accord id. at 23(c)(2)(B) (adopted in 2018,
referring “to a class proposed to be certified for purposes of settlement under Rule 23(b)(3)”).
10. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 618 (1997).
11. Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2016).
12. AM. L. INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS
(1994).
13. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §§ 3.01, 3.02 (AM. L. INST. 2010)
(discussing “General Settlement Principles” and “Court Approval of a Class-Action Settlement”).
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transformation had to be fitted within Rules designed with adjudication in mind.14
We had all learned from judicial experience.15
The prevalence of class action settlements might have been new, but certainly
disputes have reached resolution without formal adjudication for as long as there
has been law. And the practices of non-adjudicatory resolution would no doubt
move into every litigated domain. Of more immediate concern was the sheer
scale of these cases involving many billions of dollars, thousands of claimants,
complex interplays between state and federal law, and the driving force of a
formidable plaintiffs’ bar in facing down some of the most powerful institutional
actors in the economy.
For Miller, the scale may have been unimaginable, but the inquiries actually
fell into recognizable patterns. For example, the Volkswagen emissions litigation
involved improper conduct of a single critical market actor, something that could
be seen as a consumer-protection extension of the antitrust cases that were wellknown in the mid-twentieth century.16 The expansion of antitrust in the 1960s
followed on the colossal action against the Alcoa aluminum monopoly and would
lead to the extraordinary lawsuit filed by the Department of Justice in 1974 that
led to the break-up of the ATT monopoly. Similarly, the Deepwater Horizon
calamity was the product of a single-event accident organized around the
potential fault-based liability of a primary defendant, and perhaps some related
parties. This was not different in kind from the mass harms caused by an airplane
crash or a hotel fire, the kinds of tort actions that were not only known to the
Rules Committee, but were the prompts for the coordination offered by the
Multidistrict Litigation statute that quickly followed in 1968.17
But the one that stood apart was In re National Football League Players
Concussion Injury Litigation (NFL Concussion),18 a case Miller believed would
have given the Rules adopters grave pause.19 Certainly, this view had support in
the drafting history of the Rules. In the language of the Rules Committee in 1966,
“mass accident” cases, such as airplane crashes or hotel fires, were seen as likely
presenting too many idiosyncratic individual issues, such that what are now called
mass torts would be “ordinarily not appropriate” for class treatment.20 Judicial
skepticism over mass tort class actions would define the Supreme Court’s
14. See J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1716 (2012)
(“Because the drafters of the Federal Rules placed the mechanisms for robust merits adjudication at the
end of the litigation process, those mechanisms are largely unavailable to influence settlement outcomes
in a world without trials.”) (footnote omitted).
15. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 819 (2010) (“68 percent of the federal [class action] settlements in 2006
and 2007 were settlement classes.”).
16. See generally Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists’ Illegal Conduct Under the
Sherman Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809 (2000).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
18. 821 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2016) (MDL No. 2323).
19. Miller, supra note 1, at 125.
20. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (quoting the Committee for the 1966
revision of Rule 23).
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participation in the field for a generation in reaction to expansive asbestos
settlements.21 Those rulings tended to suggest that, “in most personal injury class
actions, individual issues outweigh common issues, thus disqualifying such
actions on predominance and manageability grounds”—even if some latitude
might be given to settlements.22
Although not the only example of mass torts that were resolved through class
actions, NFL Concussion was no doubt the most high profile, as would be almost
anything involving the NFL. What is most striking about the NFL decision is the
care that Judge Ambro, on behalf of unanimous panel, took to fit the decision
within well-trod guidelines for reviewing class actions. This meant not only
walking the settlement through the various Rule 23 factors, but through the
multi-step analysis offered in the Third Circuit for the approval of settlements.23
Certainly the NFL class was less sweeping than the comprehensive class
definition certified by the district court in Amchem, one that consisted of all
persons in the United States who might have been exposed occupationally to
asbestos and to all household members who were in contact with them.24 Also,
the NFL class created clear subclasses, with separate representation, for those
who had present manifestation of harm and those who only faced the prospect of
various neurocognitive impairments as a result of years of concussive hits.25 But
the real difference lay elsewhere. The gulf between Amchem and NFL
Concussion reflects both a measure of judicial confidence in the ability to handle
increasingly complex class actions, and a different focus on what is at stake in
these cases. Simply put, Amchem reads as a tale of loss, in which individual tort
claimants have relinquished their autonomous rights to pursue individual
litigation. By contrast, NFL Concussion presents as a triumph of collective
redress, one in which joint prosecution and resolution allowed the class of retired
football players to overcome several formidable defenses26 and to induce
dispositive resolution for the NFL.
NFL Concussion opens another window on the role of the class action. Broad
areas of class adjudication are being compromised, if not eviscerated, by
21. See Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the
“Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 677–82 (1979) (describing that history); see also John C.
Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 372–73 (2000) (noting that the Supreme Court’s asbestos cases “chilled” the
more expansive use of class actions); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class
Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 352 (describing how mass tort cases prompted the Supreme Court to
address “the conditions that call for aggregate treatment of the perceived class injury”); D. Theodore
Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1201 (2013) (tracing
the application of class action principles in the World Trade Center litigation).
22. Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions in the Year 2026: A Prognosis, 65 EMORY L.J. 1569, 1599–1600
(2016).
23. In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Inj. Litig. (NFL Concussion), 821 F.3d 410, 437–
41 (3d. Cir. 2016) (discussing the factors considered under Third Circuit precedent “when determining
the fairness of a proposed settlement”).
24. Amchem Prod., Inc., 521 U.S. at 602 n.5.
25. NFL Concussion, 821 F.3d at 428–30.
26. Id. at 421–22.
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arbitration clauses inserted into every manner of consumer contract and
employment relation.27 Tort cases tend to arise in extra-contractual settings,
thereby foreclosing defendants’ ability to contract out of class proceedings—with
the NFL being an odd hybrid because of it having arisen in the setting of
professional sports. Without relitigating the particulars of NFL Concussion, I
want to ask a different set of questions: what was it in judicial experience that
made this case seemingly so ordinary at the final stage of settlement class
approval, and what class action values have emerged through this experience that
bear independent examination?
My proposition is two-fold. The first is that the confining language of Rule
23(b)(3) captures two competing impulses. One is to respect the ordinary
presumption in favor of autonomy and the preservation of the individual interest
in controlling one’s own legal fate. Per the Supreme Court, a class action is “an
exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the
individual named parties only.”28 The second is that there are gains to be realized
through coordination. As in all problems of collective action, we are forever
confronted by one or another variant of the prisoner’s dilemma, the gnawing
doubt that trust in others may be betrayed by their pursuit of narrow self-interest.
We can avoid the “tragedy of the commons,”29 or more fiercely, the war of “all
against all,” through cooperation.30 But such cooperation, especially among
dispersed strangers, requires an institutional mechanism. The class action serves,
in Judith Resnik’s term, as a subsidy to this kind of collective effort to achieve
legal aims unavailable to the sole litigant.31
This tension between a commitment to the individual stake in a legal claim
and the need for collective action to realize any effective legal remedy is reflected
in Rule 23 itself, and in the mandatory inquiries into manageability,
predominance, superiority, and the desires of class members to control their own
litigation. Viewed through the prism of a light-touch textualism, even these
epigrammatic terms from the Rules highlight the tension that is being resolved
by judicial experience.
II
COORDINATION AS AN INDEPENDENT PROCESS VALUE
In interviewing Professor Miller, I pressed him on the awkward language of
Rule 23(b)(3), seemingly alone in the Rules of that period in running together a
series of convoluted formulations that seemed designed to burden the use of
27. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 623 (2012) (“[M]ost class cases will not survive the
impending tsunami of class action waivers.”).
28. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682,
700–01 (1979)).
29. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
30. THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 186 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin Books 1968) (1651).
31. Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding
Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2144–46 (2000).
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equitable powers by the courts. In general, the revisions to Rule 23 had
eliminated prior language that had no grounding in everyday speech, and had
acquired little precision in case law—terms such as “true” or “spurious” class
actions.32 Whereas the rest of the Rule was streamlined—a feature that has now
partially succumbed to a prolix era—Rule 23(b)(3), like its predecessor, threw
together terms of imprecise meaning and uncertain relation to prior cases. These
terms dictated an initial inquiry into predominance and superiority, followed by
a list of manageability and individual control considerations. From the beginning,
the language reflected a tension between those on the Rules Committee that
wanted to facilitate aggregation of low value claims and those that feared the
potential for misbehavior in the guise of efficiency. The elaborate language of
Rule 23(b)(3) was intended as a “safeguard,” said Miller, allowing some
expansion into new domains, but as always, hopefully not too much.33
The language of the Rule reflected the two competing values of individual
autonomy and the efficiency of aggregation. Two values present in (b)(3)—
predominance and an assessment of litigant interest in controlling individual
litigation—relate to individual autonomy and one’s presumptive control over a
chose in action.34 In the cases that arose mostly in equity, notably the
desegregation cases that were the primary concern of the rule revision,35
individual autonomy could have little role in shaping an injunction or a
declaratory judgment against a defendant. Clearly, no litigant could claim a right
to a personal injunction either compelling or forbidding school desegregation, for
a constitutional ruling would necessarily bind all affected parties. Even in cases
for damages at law, many involved multiple passive victims of a generalized fraud
or defective product. As Justice Ginsburg noted in Amchem, the Rule’s inquiry,
especially into predominance, “is a test readily met in certain cases alleging
consumer or securities fraud or violations of the antitrust laws.”36
Concerns for predominance and the desire of an individual to retain control
over a cause of action certainly convey a distrust of where the reach of class
actions might end up.37 The Supreme Court has long endorsed the idea of a
property right in a chose in action; if compromised, “the injury is one to

32. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (“Difficulties with the
original rule. The categories of class actions in the original rule were defined in terms of the abstract
nature of the rights involved: the so-called ‘true’ category . . . [and] the ‘spurious’ category . . . .”).
33. Miller, supra note 1, at 116.
34. A “chose in action” refers to “1. A proprietary right in personam, such as a debt owed by another
person, a share in a joint-stock company, or a claim for damages in tort. 2. The right to bring an action to
recover a debt, money, or thing.” Chose, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
35. See e.g., David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang, 19531980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587 (2013); David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and
Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657 (2011).
36. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997).
37. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the
Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1574–75 (2007) (“[C]onclud[ing] that
litigant autonomy should be acknowledged as . . . a foundational element of procedural due process . . .
[and thus] Rule 23(b)(3) class actions . . . must . . . be deemed unconstitutional.”).
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the right of property in the thing, and it is therefore unimportant as it respects
the derivation of the title; it is sufficient if it belongs to the party bringing the suit
at the time of the injury.”38 The injury is to the classic liberal right of autonomy
in the disposition of property. As famously captured by John Locke, men must
be able to “order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions and Persons, as
they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without . . . depending
upon the Will of any other Man. A State also of Equality, wherein all the Power
and Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another.”39 This concept
of litigant autonomy continues to underpin European refusal to afford res
judicata effect to American class actions. The notion that parties might be bound
to a judgment to which one did not affirmatively assent is widely perceived as
compromising rights to individual autonomy guaranteed under European law.40
Other components of Rule 23 reinforce concerns about individual rights and
acquiescence. Most notably, the right to opt out of a (b)(3) class action gives a
semblance of contractual voluntarism to the enforceability of a class decree.
Similarly, the inquiry into adequacy of representation evokes the process of
selecting leaders in both the public sphere and in private organizational
structures, such as the selection of corporate directors. But these are poor
substitutes for real participation. And if the point is to ensure something like
democratic accountability, as through elections, this generally requires repeat
play and the ability to reflect retrospectively on leadership in the next election;
that is obviously missing in class actions.41 Even the right to opt out is rarely
exercised—not surprisingly, for cases that do not justify individual prosecution
typically do not justify the investment of personal resources to monitor the
results.42 Only recently have the costs of personal participation in mass litigation
dropped sufficiently so that some forms of participation by absent class members
may supplement more traditional governance mechanisms in these cases.43
In fact, neither contract nor democracy, whatever their normative appeal,
captures the animating spirit of class actions. The fact that one does not opt out
from an undertaking that offers little fortune on its own is a poor substitute for a

38. Deshler v. Dodge, 57 U.S. 622, 631 (1853).
39. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 195–96 (Thomas Hollis ed., London, A.
Millar et al. 1764).
40. See Andrea Pinna, Recognition and Res Judicata of US Class Action Judgments in European
Legal Systems, 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 31, 37 (2008) (“[T]he opt-in requirement is fundamental to European
legal systems and therefore a judgment rendered in respect of absent and even ignorant plaintiffs would
be considered contrary to these countries’ concept of international public policy.”).
41. Samuel Issacharoff, The Governance Problem in Aggregate Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
3165, 3169, 3177 (2013).
42. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action
Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1548 (2004) (finding that opt out
numbers are low in low value consumer cases and higher in mass tort cases, as value of claims rises).
43. See generally Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Samuel Issacharoff, The Participatory Class Action, 92
N.Y.U. L. REV. 846 (2017).
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genuine meeting of the minds in classic contract tradition.44 It is closer to a
contract of adhesion whose terms cannot be altered transactionally. Similarly, a
court’s inquiry into the adequacy of representation is a far cry from the
democratic capability to pass retrospective judgment on one’s leaders through
periodic elections. Courts may test the sections of Rule 23 that mandate inquiry
into predominance and adequacy of representation as part of the formal
requirements of the Rule. But finding predominance of common issues or
adequacy of representation does not capture the key question as to why
something should proceed as a class action.
At the same time, the language in Rule 23(b)(3) about whether “a class action
is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy” goes to something different. Loosely applying principles of
statutory interpretation, both the text of the Rule itself and Professor Miller’s
account of the concerns at the time indicate that the drafters meant to do more
than subject free-standing individual claims to administrative joinder. I leave to
the side whether the language of the Rules deserves the same deference as
statutory or constitutional language, whether the Advisory Committee notes
constitute an actual legislative history, or what should be the relative weight of
text, purpose, and history in interpretation. A simple “light touch” textual
reading shows that the words point to concerns about the overall administration
of justice, measured in terms of the substantive results of aggregate litigation
rather than the nature of the rights-holder.
The superiority requirement and the inquiry about the “manageability” of a
single aggregated proceeding focus on the benefits to be gained through
coordination, and the relative costs and benefits of individual or collective
litigation. In part this is a question of whether the focus of the litigation is on the
upstream conduct of the defendant as opposed to the downstream impact on
individual plaintiffs.45 But I want to suggest here that there is more at issue. The
text of Rule 23(b)(3) directs an inquiry into the rationale for concerted
prosecution, a time-honored account of the benefits of coordination.
In political theory, contract and coordination draw on different justifications.
Whereas contract recognizes a volitional exchange of one’s property for a desired
aim, coordination does not claim the same authority. For Locke, and for the
contractarian tradition more broadly, the root of agreement comes in the right of
disposition of property, an endowment that in turn stems from exalted natural
law principles, such as the transformation of fallow land.46 But coordination
claims a more prosaic utilitarian justification in terms of what returns result. Its
leading exponent is not Locke but David Hume, for whom “the goods of human
44. See Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65,
86–87 (2003) (arguing that small-claim class members tend to be relatively uninformed about potential
legal claims).
45. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION, § 2.01 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010)
(distinguishing upstream focus from downstream cases that must assess individual harm on a classmember basis).
46. LOCKE, supra note 39, 197–99.
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society stem largely from doing as others do, in certain limited but crucial matters,
so that each person’s purposes in all other matters will mutually further others’
purposes instead of crossing them.”47 In such “coordination contexts we act from
interest and serve the mutual benefit.”48
The gains from cooperation transform an agglomeration of individual claims
into something greater than their sum, much as a corporation may create wealth
by binding individual investors to aggregated economic pursuits. The concept of
an institutional form emerging from disparate legal claims is best captured by
David Shapiro’s concept of the class as an “entity,” a corporate body that stands
above and apart from its constituent parts:
[T]he entity is the litigant and the client. Moreover, in the situations in which class action
treatment is warranted, the individual who is a member of the class, for whatever
purpose, is and must remain a member of that class, and as a result must tie his fortunes
to those of the group with respect to the litigation, its progress, and its outcome.49

On this account, class actions resemble limited venture corporations
organized for one single undertaking, with the Rules providing the distinct
internal commands of governance. Such limited liability ventures are well known
in history, with my favorite analogy being to the Venetian grant of legal status to
the sea-faring commenda, “a rudimentary type of joint stock company, which
formed only for the duration of a single trading mission.”50 In effect, Rule 23
confers the exclusive legal personhood to the class and allows it to bind class
members in order to pursue mutual gains that were unavailable individually. And
like the commenda, which unleashed the seafaring merchant power of Venice,
the Rules allowed the entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ bar to forge new economic
ventures in the form of class actions that would test the boundaries of what the
courts could handle. To the extent that class actions could resolve disputes with
gains for all the participants, the judicial comfort evident in cases such as NFL
Concussion could be realized.
III
CAPTURING JOINT GAINS
The virtues of coordination are generally implicit rather than explicit in
decisional law. This largely results from the posture of most litigated challenges
to class certification. When the opponent of certification is a defendant seeking
to force all individuals into futile private endeavors, or a serial objector who
claims an individual entitlement as a hold-up threat, challenges that focus on the
nature of individual entitlements are strategic. Almost invariably this steers the
challenge to class certification into a discussion of the predominance of individual
47. ANDREW SABL, HUME’S POLITICS: COORDINATION AND CRISIS IN THE HISTORY OF
ENGLAND 6 (2012).
48. RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 18 (2000).
49. David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913,
919 (1998).
50. DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER,
PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 152 (2012).
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versus common issues. The result is a highly unsatisfying body of case law that
asks whether common issues outnumber individual inquiries,51 the amount of trial
time that would be devoted to each (even if approval of a settlement class was at
issue),52 and the persistence of individual inquiries over reliance, choice of law,
or damages.53 Courts try to grapple with this within the framework of the
predominance inquiry, but the result is generally frustrating.54
Case law built around strategic invocations of individual autonomy tilt the
jurisprudence away from serious engagement with the reasons class actions
continue to thrive. For courts faced with mass harms, the question is not whether
to aggregate but how to aggregate. Although not guided by the case law, courts
increasingly recognize the gains from coordinated activity, and have started to
recognize those concrete gains alongside formal concerns with predominance or
the putative individual interest in controlling litigation. A decade ago, the
American Law Institute remarked on the growing attention to the independent
value of comprehensive resolution of disputes—what is termed “global peace”—
in securing more for a cohesive group than what disparate individuals could hope
for.55 Comprehensive resolution offers “predictability and conclusiveness . . . to
bring into existence additional resources for distribution by way of the class
settlement.” And the ensuing global peace generates a “peace premium”
available only through a class resolution.56
Such a “peace premium” stems from the lower anticipated transaction costs
for a defendant facing no further litigation. But it also reflects the value of
dispelling the stigma and uncertainty that follows from potential liability.
Realizing this collective benefit, which by definition cannot be realized by any
litigant operating individually, may provide one element of the “superiority”
anticipated by the language of the Rules.

51. E.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622–25 (1997); Comcast Corp. v.
Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33–36 (2013); Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 800–01 (7th Cir. 2013);
see also 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 4:49, 4:52 (5th ed. 2012)
(articulating the predominance requirement and providing examples).
52. By and large, parties to settlements address the predominance issue to the satisfaction of
reviewing courts. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 51, § 4:77 (noting that cases generally show that “courts have
granted certification at settlement after themselves having denied it for trial purposes”). There are,
however, the occasional misfires that raise predominance of trial issues even in the settlement context.
See, e.g., In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ. Litig., 881 F.3d 679 (9th Cir. 2018); In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc.
Sec. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
53. See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 792–800 (2013)
(highlighting these as areas of doctrinal resistance to class actions).
54. See, e.g., Torres v. Mercer Canyons Inc., 835 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Predominance is
not, however, a matter of nose-counting. Rather, more important questions apt to drive the resolution of
the litigation are given more weight in the predominance analysis over individualized questions which
are of considerably less significance to the claims of the class.”) (citation omitted).
55. In turn, the concept developed from the observations of Francis McGovern. See Francis E.
McGovern, Toward A Cooperative Strategy for Federal and State Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1867, 1894 (2000) (formulating the term as a “peace premium for corporate predictability”).
56. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.10 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
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This intuition can be grounded in recent class action case law, with an initial
example to set the inquiry. In Sullivan v. DB Investments,57 the Third Circuit
confronted a proposed settlement of a national antitrust case against De Beers,
the giant South African diamond conglomerate. De Beers was notoriously and
openly a cartel. But it scrupulously maintained all its operations outside the
United States, even though its market domination conditioned prices in every
corner of the world.58 For more than half a century, antitrust challenges
floundered on the legal obstacles this imposed, including such mundane issues as
personal jurisdiction and service of process.59 De Beers conducted its direct
transactions only with foreign intermediaries who in turn sold to wholesalers that
imported the product into the American market. Cartel power yielded the ability
to dominate sales in the United States, but from a safe perch beyond this country.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, however, Russia began mass production of
cheaper and mostly lower-quality diamonds, which flooded the market and began
to erode the effectiveness of the De Beers cartel. For the first time, De Beers
sought to tap into the American retail market to profit from its strategic market
presence and the brand value of its name. But to do so would require a presence
in the United States that in turn could serve as the basis for liability under the
American antitrust laws and their presumption of treble damages. The pull of
American consumers directly met the push of liability.
Not surprisingly, a deal was in the offing. De Beers would accept service of
process and submit to personal jurisdiction in the United States, in exchange for
a structured deal covering its past liabilities.60 What is significant is that, absent a
comprehensive deal, there could be no release from litigation that would allow
for entry into the American market.61 Without coordination, no plaintiff standing
alone would fare any better than plaintiffs in all the prior efforts to pursue claims
against De Beers. For De Beers, there was a huge market reward if the deal could
be consummated. For the class of purchasers of diamonds in the retail jewelry
market—termed indirect purchasers in the antitrust context—De Beers offered
57. 667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011).
58. Id. at 300.
59. See id. at 314 (“De Beers’s avoidance of effective antitrust prosecution in light of the twin
difficulties of obtaining jurisdiction over the foreign corporations and of retaining within the court’s reach
tangible assets sufficient to enforce a decree.”) (quoting The Diamond Cartel, 56 YALE L.J. 1404, 1411
(1947)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 288, 291.
61. Some would argue that there should be no unanimity requirement and that more individual
autonomy is preserved by allowing a 98% level of acceptance or a 95% level of acceptance so that the
pressure to compel client acceptance is not so overwhelming. Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with
All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 979, 1024 (2010); see also Howard M.
Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red Flags in Class Action Settlements, 92 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 859, 864 (2016) (arguing that class action settlements have the propensity to unjustly disempower
claimants). This has the feel of debates over moving first base back five feet to avoid close plays; wherever
the threshold is set, the question becomes whether the gains from coordination can be factored into the
reason to have a class action. See THE GIGANTIC BOOK OF BASEBALL QUOTATIONS 63 (Wayne Stewart
ed., 2007) (“‘They should move first base back one step to eliminate all those close plays.’ –
Outfielder/designated hitter John Lowenstein.”).
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a payoff of over $272 million, with another $22.5 million going to direct
purchasers.62 All in all, this was a fairly common class settlement, closing out
liability in exchange for a damages payment and some injunctive relief against
future anticompetitive activity.
But there was a problem: not all plaintiffs were identically situated. At least
some of the claims were arguably more valuable in states that allowed what is
termed an “Illinois Brick repealer,” meaning that indirect purchasers had an
independent cause of action even though they had not purchased directly from
the cartel. By contrast, purchasers in “non-repealer” states could not sue, and
could only hope that direct purchasers would protect them against
anticompetitive behavior. To be sure, Rule 23(a)(2) speaks only of common
issues, not identical issues, and Rule 23(b)(3) insists that common issues must
predominate, not that they must be exclusive. Nonetheless, on its face, this was a
genuine intraclass distinction, yielding more valuable claims for some class
members, and potentially no claims for others who were limited to recovery as
indirect purchasers in a non-repealer state. In addition, there were state
consumer protection law claims that varied state-by-state. The challengers, and
an initial panel of the Third Circuit, were persuaded that “a district court must
ensure that each class member possesses a viable claim or ‘some colorable legal
claim.’”63
But even at this level, the cases were complicated. After all, a resident of a
non-repealer state could have bought a diamond while traveling to another state
or may have been asserting a claim based on the first sale of a particular diamond
in New York, the port of entry for the bulk of the American diamond market.
Perhaps the state of purchase allowed for the extraterritorial protection of
consumers, or perhaps the state antitrust laws of one or another state allowed an
extra modicum of legal protection and potential recovery. These were potential
differences among all class members, and they muddied the waters as to whether
common issues predominated. Indeed, that is what the original panel had ruled,64
and what the dissent on rehearing continued to advocate.65
What then? It would be possible, at least in theory, to trace the appropriate
choice of law for each of the many thousand class members, but only at a cost far
exceeding the small value of most consumer diamond purchases. Such an
approach would doom a class action just as surely as requiring individual actions.
In Judge Posner’s memorable formulation, “only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for
$30.”66 In the small value context, “the realistic alternative to a class action is not

62. Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 288.
63. Id. at 285.
64. Id. at 293–94.
65. Id. at 346 (Jordan, J., dissenting) (“Because of differences among those statutes, it is clear that
some class members are entirely without a cognizable claim. . . . ‘[S]uch variances . . . are so significant as
to defeat commonality and predominance even in a settlement class certification[.]’”) (quoting In re
Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 529–30 (3d Cir. 2004)).
66. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
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17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits.”67 By extension, raising the
transactional cost of a consumer class action by requiring these individualized
inquiries would doom the collective enterprise every bit as surely as the limited
value of the underlying individual claims would doom efforts at individual
litigation.
The Third Circuit, now acting en banc, addressed this issue as a matter of the
manageability of a class action, as a court routinely confronting an onslaught of
litigation arising from the undifferentiated conduct of a particular actor:
[W]here a defendant’s singular conduct gives rise to one cause of action in one state,
while providing for a different cause of action in another jurisdiction, the courts may
group both claims in a single class action. This tactic in litigation advances the laudatory
purposes of the class action device, “preserv[ing] the resources of both the courts and
the parties by permitting issues affecting all class members to be litigated in an efficient,
expedited, and manageable fashion.”68

But that could hardly be all; a refusal to certify the class would have doomed any
individual enforcement action to the likely lack of personal jurisdiction, and the
insufficiency of individual stakes to incentivize an effort to overcome that legal
hurdle. So, the real question before the court was whether there could be private
redress for systematic conduct with wide effects.
Sullivan presented an extreme version of a phenomenon that I have
previously described as “private rights, aggregate claims”69—an endowment of
rights to individual persons that have value as legal claims only when joined
together with others. Most often, this is the problem of “negative value” claims,
in which the transactional costs of vindication exceed the expected return from
prosecution of the legal action. This is what Judge Posner captured in referring
to the (hopefully) limited population of lunatics and fanatics who would bring
such claims. Courts frequently refer to such negative value claims as a significant
factor favoring class certification.70 But transactional costs are not the entire story
and represent a subset of a broader universe of gains from coordination.
Amortizing the costs of litigation is one reason that there are gains from
proceeding in the aggregate, and may be the most significant in many cases. But
the inquiry goes beyond the cost calculus.
Class actions are but one of a series of coordinating devices that compel
transactional completion in the resolution of legal claims. A state may bring a

67. Id. (emphasis omitted).
68. Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 302 (quoting Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 410 (5th Cir.
1998)).
69. Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183.
70. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The most compelling rationale
for finding superiority in a class action . . . [is] the existence of a negative value suit.”); In re RhonePoulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (“In most class actions—and those the ones in
which the rationale for the procedure is most compelling—individual suits are infeasible because the
claim of each class member is tiny relative to the expense of litigation.”); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 51, §
4:65 (discussing the “[s]uperiority [of class actions] in small claim or vulnerable population cases”).
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parens patriae action asserting the rights of all its affected citizens.71 Similarly, a
probate hearing must compel the complete resolution of all claims against an
estate, and a bankruptcy proceeding must similarly resolve all claims against a
distressed business in deciding whether to liquidate or restructure as an ongoing
concern. In all such circumstances the rights belong to an individual, but cannot
be vindicated without collective resolution. In individual hands, such rights are
phantasmagoric, a semblance of reality like the shadows in Plato’s allegory of the
cave. Without a mechanism for vindication, these rights have form but no
substance.
Bankruptcy well recognizes the interplay between private entitlement and
collective redress. The claim of a creditor in bankruptcy arises from private
contractual relations and, classically, that chose in action is a private endowment
of a property claim. Yet there is no due process right to individual vindication of
such a creditor’s claim because the beneficial disposition of the corpus of the
debtor turns on joint resolution of all creditor obligations. Bankruptcy therefore
recognizes the individual source of the right to recover but presumes that any
such recovery will be through the aggregate.
As a result, bankruptcy law and procedure are replete with analyses of how
to protect the individual interest through the collective resolution, starting with
the formation of creditor’s committees, and continuing through the recognition
of priorities of different claims on the estate, and finally ending up in the equal
treatment of comparably situated claimants.72 The aims of all these aggregative
devices largely converge,73 with one exception. Bankruptcy and probate start
from the assumption that there must be collective resolution and then adjust
individual protections accordingly, whereas ordinary civil litigation starts from
the premise of individual autonomy, even where aggregate proceedings are
inevitable. Troy McKenzie develops this point in arguing for the comparative
advantage of bankruptcy as a model for mass adjudication, particularly in the
mass tort context:
The major element running throughout the architecture of the bankruptcy process is
that the judicial system and society benefit from unified proceedings in a single forum
in which all interested parties in the debtor’s fate are represented. For mass tort
litigation, that conception of the role of a court in guiding litigation has obvious
advantages for the management and equitable resolution of a multitude of claims. The
judicial system as a whole benefits from the reduction in duplicative and competing

71. On the parallels and competing benefits of class actions and parens patriae actions including the
risk of agency costs, see generally Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative
Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486 (2012).
72. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.01 (16th ed. 2020) (describing the basic tenets of American
bankruptcy law).
73. See In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 242 n.57, 245 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[S]ettlement must
provide for ‘equity among members of the class’ and ‘fairness of the distribution of the fund among class
members’ . . . . Though Ortiz was decided under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B), the Court’s requirement of
fair treatment for all claimants—a principle at the core of equity—also applies in the context of this case.”
(citing Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 854–55 (1999))) (“In the resolution of future asbestos
liability, under bankruptcy or otherwise, future claimants must be adequately represented throughout
the process.” (citing Amchem, Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–28 (1997))).
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proceedings. Claimants benefit from the greater attention to equitable treatment of
claims for compensation. And society benefits from the closer calibration of a
defendant’s conduct to the compensation the defendant will pay for harms caused by
that conduct.74

Further, bankruptcy presumes that there will be gains from the unified resolution
of all creditors’ claims, and that this will accrue to the benefit of all those with
demands upon the estate. There is a reason that bankruptcy proved to be the
coordination mechanism in asbestos cases following the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Amchem and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp..75 Bankruptcy also introduces
the critical element of voting to allow stakeholders to vindicate their individual
rights within the aggregate.76
Sullivan significantly advances the inquiry in class action law by moving the
discussion of those joint gains, now embraced under the term of “global peace,”
front and center in class action law parallel to the view advocated by the
American Law Institute. For the Third Circuit, compelling a reviewing court to
limit a class settlement to individuals with an established claim “would effectively
rule out the ability of a defendant to achieve ‘global peace’ by obtaining releases
from all those who might wish to assert claims, meritorious or not.”77 The court
went on to credit the underlying interest that could only be achieved by a
comprehensive resolution:
[I]n an effort to avoid protracted litigation and future relitigation of settled questions in
federal and state courts across numerous jurisdictions, De Beers pursued a global
settlement and demanded a release of potential damage claims in all fifty states . . . .
Specifically, De Beers sought “global peace” in a settlement covering plaintiffs in every
federal and state case, as well as potential plaintiffs who had not yet filed cases in either
federal or state court.78

Such a return to finality cannot be realized by any individual claimant in
negotiating the terms of an individual settlement nor, correspondingly, can it be
achieved by the defendant in settlement with any particular claimant. Professor
Rave explains the gain-gain scenario that prompts the greater returns for all
claimants if a comprehensive deal can be realized:
[A] global settlement generates efficiencies and saves on transaction costs for
defendants as well as plaintiffs. Handling claims in bulk is more cost effective for
defendants. Accordingly, the cost of litigating against a few opt-outs may be
disproportionately high – the flip side of the economies of scale in aggregation. There
are simply fewer cases across which to spread the costs of developing common factual
or legal issues that will arise at trial. Further, if defendants can offer a lump sum and
disclaim any role in the allocation, they can avoid the cost of valuing and negotiating

74. Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass Aggregate Litigation, 97 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 960, 1004–05 (2012).
75. See Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1741–
50 (2002) (describing challenges of mass tort as problems of coordination among the various
constellations of defendants, plaintiffs, and courts that are typically involved).
76. In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 244 (3d Cir. 2004) (“By providing impaired creditors
the right to vote on confirmation, the Bankruptcy Code ensures the terms of the reorganization are
monitored by those who have a financial stake in its outcome.”).
77. Sullivan v. DB Invs., 667 F.3d 273, 310 (3d Cir. 2011).
78. Id. at 310–11.
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individual claims. And broad settlements give defendants better returns on the sunk
costs they have already spent on valuation and negotiation. The marginal cost of adding
another claim to a group settlement is typically less than the cost of negotiating a
separate settlement. For similar reasons, defendants will often pay to settle even weak
claims as part of a global deal to avoid the nuisance of protracted litigation . . . .
[Further,] defendants may be willing to pay extra for finality because it reduces the
chances that future losses at trial or serial settlements will encourage the filing of new
claims.79

To circle back to NFL Concussion, the prior experience of Sullivan and
similar cases allowed the Third Circuit to give independent weight to the need
for closure to improve the condition of the entire class of retired football players.
For the NFL, a main consideration was the public explosiveness of the charge
that “despite the NFL’s awareness of the risks of repetitive head trauma, the
League ignored, minimized, or outright suppressed information concerning the
link between that trauma and cognitive damage.”80 On the other side of the
ledger, the former players faced having most of their claims preempted by federal
labor laws governing the interpretation of the NFL’s collective bargaining
agreements.81 For the NFL, the glare of adverse publicity was a vulnerability, but
one that could only be addressed in the aggregate—discovery in any individual
case could yield the same information, assuming that individual cases could
justify the expenses of the process. For the retired players, any legal resolution of
preemption, even in an individual case, threatened the viability of all litigation as
a practical matter, as did the hurdle of translating epidemiological evidence into
the causation for any particular player’s injuries.82
Doctrinally, consistent with how litigation challenges are framed, the opinion
in NFL Concussion pushed the inquiry into the framework of predominance.83 A
handful of individual objectors claimed that their interests were not represented
and that other issues of latent injuries compromised predominance of the
settlement terms. The major doctrinal innovation of the opinion—crediting the
number of private lawsuits and non-class lawyers as evidence of the oversight on
the quality of the deal obtained84—was considered under the rather ill-fitting
rubric of adequacy of representation. The court looked to the extraordinary
number of lawyers scrutinizing the deal to confirm that real stakeholders
appreciated the benefits obtained from the overall settlement. The court took the
challenges doctrinally as presented: individuals claiming that adequacy of
representation or predominance were not met. But the court’s resolution would
not have made sense without the core insight that there were gains from
coordination, and that those had been realized to the benefit of the entire class.

79. Rave, supra note 21, at 1194; see also Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill
Settlement and the Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 414, 417 (2014) (analyzing the greater
returns available as a result of comprehensive settlement following Deepwater Horizon spill).
80. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Inj. Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2016).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 439–40.
83. Id. at 434.
84. Id. at 433.
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IV
TESTING THE BOUNDARIES
Returning to the language, Rule 23(b)(3) requires a court to find “that the
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”85
As discussed earlier, these can be thought of as presenting the two sides of
aggregation: integrity in the handling of private rights of action and overcoming
coordination problems in seeking aggregated resolution. Cases such as NFL
Concussion or Sullivan address the initial hurdle of excessive attention to
individual claims based on narrow interpretations of predominance. NFL
Concussion goes one step further in allowing active participation and monitoring
by a substantial portion of the class to be a guarantee of proper representation.
Each of these cases underscores the gains to be realized from global resolution,
not only for the defendants, but for the collective welfare of the plaintiff classes.
But these cases stop short of addressing exactly how to overcome the deleterious
consequences of allowing individual class member to hold out for a
disproportionate share by objecting or threatening to opt out of any proposed
global resolution.
The ability to claim an individual premium after a potential deal is struck is
the foothold for strategic objectors to class actions.86 Once the deal is in place,
the need for global resolution allows for a hold-out by the last class member
standing whose participation is necessary for the deal to close. The preferred
mechanism for such strategic objectors is to file a notice of appeal after a
perfunctory objection in the district court, and then to offer to withdraw that
appeal for a premium, generally paid to objector’s counsel. The intervention of
such objectors reduces the benefit for the class because both the defendant and
class counsel have to withhold some of the potential class payment in order to
pay off subsequent extortion. The 2018 reforms of Rule 23(e) sought to curb that
practice by requiring disclosure to the district court of any side payment
arrangements, hoping thereby to deter an evident strategic impediment to being
able to negotiate for global peace.
Unfortunately, such strategic objectors are not the only obstacle to obtaining
the peace premium that comes with complete resolution. Most class actions are
settled before a litigation class is certified, meaning that class counsel and the
class representatives cannot claim any conclusive authority to represent all class
members. To the extent the defendant is willing to reward completion, the ability
to achieve global peace remains speculative. Class settlements typically contract
around this with a minimum participation threshold—frequently termed a “blow
85. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
86. Robert Klonoff, Class Action Objectors: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 89 FORD. L. REV.
475, 477 (2021) (defining ugly objectors as those that “raise objections not to improve the settlement but
to extort payments from class counsel in exchange for dismissing their objections. Such objectors do not
even arguably serve a legitimate purpose”).
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provision”—that defines a walk-away right for the defendant.87 Such
negotiations, however, risk leaving potential benefits on the table in the form of
funds reserved to address opt outs who continue to litigate, in addition to buying
off strategic objectors.
The inability to commit ahead of time to a coordinated strategy is a variant
of the tragedy of the commons, particularly when stakeholders have different
claims that might prompt strategic holdouts. As Professors McGovern and
Rubinstein explain,
Heterogeneous classes therefore present a collective action problem somewhat akin to
a prisoner’s dilemma: everyone in the group might be best off – along several
dimensions – if they could work together, but lacking a clear mechanism by which to do
so, coordination costs render that option illusive. The tragedy of this commons is that,
built on a different template, class action law does not immediately appear to provide a
coordination mechanism.88

In individual litigation, parties can agree to coordinate by waiving conflicts,
as with a wife and husband agreeing to be represented by the same estate lawyer,
so long as they are sophisticated enough to trade off the transactional gains
against the potential conflicts.89 The question becomes whether the same
elements can be realized in aggregated proceedings. In such aggregated
proceedings, there is the compounding problem that the mass of potential
claimants present themselves as an undifferentiated bundle, each of which has
the ability to opt out. For defendants, there is the overwhelming risk of adverse
selection as a result of the right of class action plaintiffs to opt out. “When
plaintiffs can opt-out of settlements, there is a danger that those with the
strongest claims will do so, leaving a defendant with a settlement dominated by
weak claims.”90
A New Jersey state case posed the collective action issue in provocative
fashion outside the class action context. A group of franchisees of a national tax
preparation service decided to sue collectively and agreed to bind themselves to
joint funding of the lawsuit, a predetermined recovery schedule, and an
agreement to be bound by the outcome of any settlement if a supermajority voted

87. 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:6 (5th ed. Dec. 2020 update)
(explaining that these provisions allow “the defendant to withdraw from—or ‘blow up’—a settlement if
a certain number of class members opt out of the settlement”); see also D. Theodore Rave, Closure
Provisions in MDL Settlements, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175, 2180 (2017) (addressing “walk-away
provisions”).
88. Francis E. McGovern & William B. Rubenstein, The Negotiation Class: A Cooperative Approach
to Class Actions Involving Large Stakeholders, 99 TEX. L. REV. 73, 78 (2020).
89. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 122 cmt. D (AM. L. INST. 2000)
(“A client’s open-ended agreement to consent to all conflicts normally should be ineffective unless the
client possesses sophistication in the matter in question and has had the opportunity to receive
independent legal advice about the consent.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 22 (“[I]f
the client is an experienced user of the legal services involved and is reasonably informed regarding the
risk that a conflict may arise, [general and open-ended] consent is more likely to be effective.”).
90. Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 733, 760 (1997).
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in favor.91 An agreement was reached, a vote was taken, but then a hold-out
challenged the ability to enforce the outcome. The case clearly presented the
Lockean private right to a chose in action against the Humean gain from
coordinated action. The New Jersey Supreme Court hesitated, found the contract
enforceable in the immediate case, but then expressed skepticism that this could
be done and pushed the question of such arrangements off to the rules process
prospectively. But the question endured: Why cannot a sophisticated group of
commonly situated litigants form their own commenda, a limited liability joint
venture with clear rules of participation and internal resolution? Every purchase
of stock, every purchase of a condominium, every membership at a gym, all are
contractual realizations of potential joint gains at the cost of yielding elements of
personal autonomy to specified forms of organization. Why not a joint litigation
venture among the same people who routinely buy stock, homes, and club
memberships? If global peace is a collective good, why cannot those who benefit
by it agree ahead of time on the rules by which it might be realized?
The American Law Institute proposed just such an approach,92 adapting the
voting system from Section 524(g) of the bankruptcy code governing agreed upon
resolution of asbestos insolvencies93 and proposing similar supermajority
resolution for common legal undertakings.94 Such an approach would not help
small-claim consumer actions,95 but would create the ability to form a class-like
mechanism without the formality of Rule 23. In effect, the ALI approach allowed
a class-like mechanism to emerge from private ordering rather than judicial
decree, reflecting a world of complex cases in which closure became the desired
end state.96 The ALI proposal, to borrow from Professor Lahav, did not come
from nowhere, but reflected the maturing judicial understanding that “aggregate
solutions are inevitable and aggregation takes on whichever form most easily
allows cases to travel towards settlement.”97 By whichever pathway, the various
forms of aggregation share both central problematics and aims. As summarized
by Lahav, these are the goal of “horizontal equity” among the stakeholders, the
risk of principal-agent costs as individuals are subsumed in the aggregate, and the

91. Tax Auth., Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512 (N.J. 2006) (holding that a retainer
agreement containing a weighted-majority provision for settlement of the litigation would be
unenforceable under Rule 1.8(g); however, the court upheld the settlement in question and applied its
decision only prospectively).
92. PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.17 (AM. L. INST. 2010). Once again, a
disclosure: Together with Robert Klonoff, Richard Nagareda, and Charles Silver, I served as the
Reporter for the ALI on this undertaking.
93. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb).
94. See PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.17 cmt. d(2) (AM. L. INST. 2010)
(“Sophisticated clients, such as businesspersons or investors, are more likely than others to appreciate
the benefits and risks of subjecting themselves to some form of substantial-majority rule.”).
95. For skepticism that claimants can rely on democratic mechanisms if the stakes are low, see
Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65, 86–87 (2003).
96. Morgan A. McCollum, Local Government Plaintiffs and the Opioid Multi-District Litigation, 94
N.Y.U. L. REV. 938 (2019).
97. Alexandra D. Lahav, The Continuum of Aggregation, 53 GA. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2019).
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need to reconcile global resolution with the decentralized system of dispute
resolution across multiple states and the federal-state divide.98
From that came the most innovative effort at realizing collective gains from
aggregated litigation. Fittingly in an issue devoted to the achievements of Francis
McGovern, the undertaking came from him and Professor Rubinstein. The effort
is to realize the gains from global peace by inviting class members to agree to be
bound by collective resolution based on a clear supermajority vote, drawing on
the ALI proposal, and in turn on the experience with asbestos bankruptcies and
the New Jersey state tax franchisees’ collective action. Voting is key under
bankruptcy because “providing impaired creditors the right to vote on
confirmation, the Bankruptcy Code ensures the terms of the reorganization are
monitored by those who have a financial stake in its outcome.”99
The proposal goes thus:
As applied in the class context, the idea unfolds in five stages: (1) active class members
initially work together to generate a distributional metric for allocating a lump sum
settlement among the class members and a related voting scheme for responding to any
proposed settlement; (2) once these mechanisms are in place, putative class counsel
moves for certification of an opt-out Rule 23(b)(3) class, with certification limited to the
sole purpose of negotiating a lump sum settlement with the defendant; (3) if the court
grants class certification, class members receive notice explaining the allocation metric
and the supermajority voting scheme and they are given a one-time opportunity to opt
out of the class; (4) after the opt-out period ends and the class size is fixed, the class’s
counsel and representatives attempt to negotiate a lump sum settlement with one or
more defendants; (5) if achieved, the amount of the lump sum is put to a classwide vote,
and if it garners supermajority support, the entire class is bound by that vote; class
counsel and the defendant then move for final judicial approval of the settlement.100

This proposal was realized in what is termed the “negotiation class” in the
National Prescription Opiate Litigation. Fittingly, the litigation exists across all
frontiers of aggregation, with Purdue Pharma in bankruptcy, state level litigation
in various courts, a nationwide MDL of all the cities and counties that have filed
suit, and, finally, the proposed creation of a pre-arranged negotiation entity in an
MDL proceeding. The architects of the proposal, Professors McGovern and
Rubinstein, served as special masters in the opioid MDL and could help usher
their proposal from the drawing board to lived experience. The aim was to realize
collective benefits through bargaining and voting: “By providing a mechanism for
keeping the whole class together as a bargaining unit, the negotiation class’s
primary goal is to resolve the collective action problem presented by a
heterogeneous class of large and small stakeholders.”101
As with many first steps, the results are mixed. The proposal was approved
by the district court and then reversed by a split panel of the Sixth Circuit.102
Because I served as counsel to advocate adoption in both the district court and

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 1404–09.
In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 244 (3d Cir. 2004).
McGovern & Rubenstein, supra note 88, at 79.
Id. at 104.
In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 976 F.3d 664 (6th Cir. 2020).
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the Sixth Circuit, I will leave further elaboration to others. Suffice it to say that,
in keeping with Professor Lahav’s assessment of the evolving understanding of
aggregation, this proposal too “did not come out of nowhere.”103 Whether the
precise form of the negotiation class perseveres on future application or is
replaced by another mechanism, no approach to redressing mass harm will ever
return to the presumed halcyon days of one-by-one adjudication.
V
CONCLUSION
More than a century ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes captured the heart of the
common law methodology: “The life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience . . . . The law embodies the story of a nation’s development
through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.”104
When pressed about the perceived need to reform the Federal Rules only a
quarter century after their initial adoption, Arthur Miller invoked the Holmesian
concept of law as a distillation of lived experience. The joinder rules as initially
promulgated in 1938 “were underused, and it was thought time to rationalize
them, to tie them together better than they had been tied in the 30s, and to clarify
the text to capture the 25 years of experience, and to insert that experience under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure into the rules.”105
Much has changed in the scale and reach of class actions since the major
reforms of Rule 23 in 1966, driven in the Holmesian sense by the growing
confidence of the judicial ability to manage increasingly complex social issues and
the ability to realize the benefits of collective resolution. As judicial experience
with large class actions has grown, courts have come to appreciate the value of
global peace as providing greater benefits than could ever be realized in isolated
litigation, even were that to be pursued. The core argument presented in this
Article is that the open-textured language of the Rules invites judicial
experimentation and that this experience becomes the lifeblood of the evolution
of the law.
For reasons well beyond the scope of this Article, the reforms of today move
through judicial innovation rather than formal rules amendment; the latter trails
rather than leads. The first conclusion that emerges is the increasing judicial
capacity to engage in “midstream corrections” that innovate “while litigation is
pending, in response to problems that arise in specific disputes, resulting in ad
hoc procedure.”106 What begins ad hoc gets refined through practice. Whatever
the formal amendments to Rule 23 in the years after 1966, what changed most
between the initial skepticism over the class resolution of mass harm cases and

103.
104.
105.
106.

Lahav, supra note 97, at 1403.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (Harvard Univ. Press 2009) (1881).
Miller, supra note 1, at 107.
Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 767, 774 (2017).
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NFL Concussion was the testing of judicial innovation and the emerging
confidence in the ability of aggregative procedures to address major societal
concerns.
The second conclusion also pushes the boundaries of this Article. Much of
the innovation of what is termed “ad hoc procedure” occurs through the give and
take of case management. These matters become the deep wisdom of courts that
must handle the large disaster cases. By contrast, doctrine reflects only the
manner in which cases are presented for final adjudication. Thus, in the sweeping
resolution of the VW emissions scandal, the Ninth Circuit responded only to
objectors who were either trying to insinuate themselves into the settlement by
claiming a trivial conflict in representation of resold versus owner-retained cars107
or by demanding attorneys’ fees in disregard of the district court’s case
management orders.108 Only the most discerning interstitial reader could piece
together the complex organizational structure that allowed the entire controversy
to be resolved in barely a year. Similarly, because so much of the class action law
is generated by strategic objectors claiming that their ability to vindicate their $30
claim is compromised by nefarious aggregative procedures, the law is heavily
focused on the predominance prong of Rule 23(b)(3). Predominance is only one
of the lines of inquiry of Rule 23(b)(3), but it is the one that sounds most clearly
in a Lockean claim to inalienable individual rights.
For courts tasked with the great mass cases of the day, the question is one of
the equitable administration of justice and the efficient use of judicial resources.
Rule 23(b)(3) assigns these values to the superiority prong of the class inquiry, a
recognition of the Humean insight into coordinated behavior. While not as
prominent in the case law, this well captures the practices in courts today.
Amchem may still define the doctrinal contours of mass harm class actions.
Judicial experience moves on.

107. In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg. Litig., 895 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2018).
108. In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg. Litig., 914 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2019).

